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TO LABOR IN THE DANCING WORLD:
HUMAN RIGHTS AT WORK
Erin E. Bahn*
I. INTRODUCTION
Dance is a time sensitive activity. For many dancers their whole
life, from a very young age, is focused on dance. Many do not get an
education because every moment is dedicated to dance. Your art is shaped
by the hours of work you spend loving it. The food you eat shapes your
body. You never leave your tools of work. It is your body and you take it
everywhere. After many years of dance consuming your life and your love,
to have this life ended by an employer without "just cause" for termination
is cruel. It leaves the artist in an extraordinarily bad situation. Firing a
dancer is truly a life-altering crisis. For some dancers suicide seems like
the only viable alternative when dance is no longer possible. It is funda-
mental to a dancer's life to be able to work and be onstage to express what
is their meaning of life.
Dance is a form of labor not unlike other kinds of labor. However,
dancers are uniquely vulnerable under their collective bargaining agree-
ments due to the lack of just cause discharge provisions. This note will
examine collective bargaining in dance and how dancers, like other work-
ers, must be provided just cause discharge provisions in their contracts.
Without these provisions there is no protection against employers arbitrarily
firing a worker. Workers need a mechanism of recourse to which they can
receive due process through the arbitration and grievance procedure. The
life presented to a dancer on the job through his or her dance contract provi-
sions will be examined as a crystallized example of human labor which is
performed through the direction of the employer. The chorecgraphy of peo-
ples' jobs may vary, but the human right to just discharge and due process
remains constant. Through dance this article will seek to find an equitable
balance between the subjective world of employers' desires and the objec-
tive world of human labor and needs.
The most secure work for a dancer is to be a member of a major
dance company. The dancers in major dance companies in the United
States are represented by the American Guild of Musical Artists (AGMA).
* J.D. 2001, University at Buffalo School of Law; Graduate of New York Univer-
sity Tisch School of the Arts with a BFA in Dance 1998. Apprenticed with modem
dance choreographer Merce Cunningham 1993-1994. I would like to thank Profes-
sor James B. Atleson for his assistance, support and solidarity in the writing of this
piece.
BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 7
AGMA is the largest representative of dancers in the United States. The
human rights of workers to have safe working conditions, substantive rights
to protection against discharge without "just cause" and the procedural
rights to challenge unjust termination, will be examined in the dance world
using current AGMA collective bargaining agreements of numerous Ameri-
can dance companies.
However, there is a unique contract mechanism within the AGMA
contracts which leaves dancers without a substantive right to not be dis-
charged without "just cause" and the procedural right to challenge any dis-
charge through the grievance and arbitration process. Not only do dancers'
rights under this contract offend basic notions of industrial democracy, but
such contracts are in complete odds with the International Labor Organiza-
tion, Termination of Employment Convention, 1982.' These rights are also
protected under the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, 1978.2 This lack of protection against "arbitrary and capricious"
termination also effectively destroys any protection the dancer has facing
discrimination against union activities, racial discrimination, discrimination
against sexual orientation, and protections against sexual harassment. The
right to be protected against such discrimination is found within the collec-
tive bargaining agreements; however, the right of the employer to terminate
employment at will renders such clauses as meaningless. This note will ex-
amine the elements of collective bargaining in dance and provide recom-
mendations for equitable changes or reform.
The slight imposition on an employer to justify firing a dancer pro-
vides the dancer a fundamental security. "Most collective agreements do,
in fact, require 'cause' or 'just cause' for discharge or discipline." 3 After
the dancer's devotion and investment of energy into a dance company, that
dance company owes the dancer some justification for actions to terminate.
The dancer is expected to give his or her life to dance. To give the dancer
adequate respect, there must be some mechanisms to stop whimsical firing
for whatever reasons the employer feels like at the time. When terminating
an employee, the employer needs to be able to articulate and justify the
reasons for doing it. If there is a dispute about these reasons there needs to
be an objective third party who has the authority to evaluate whether the
employer has met his burden under the contract to establish "just cause" for
these actions. "A significant percentage of cases that reach arbitration in-
I See International Labor Organization, Termination of Employment Convention,
1982 convention 158 (1982).
2 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948.




volve discharge or disciplinary penalties assessed by management."'4 By
this demand, there is no utopian expectation of lifetime employment. There
will still be disputes over terminations, but these must not be "arbitrary and
capricious" terminations cloaked in non-reengagement contract terms.
II. DANCE CONTRACT PROVISIONS
A. Typical Clauses (but unique to dance contracts)
Dance contracts have very particular provisions for the life of a
dancer which seem unusual to an outsider. Every craft, trade or industry
has unique needs involving its work. People who work with steel pipe are
concerned with steel-toed boots and construction workers need hard hats.
As with any industry, dancers provide needs in their employment in the
collective bargaining agreements. Dancers insist on finely detailed defini-
tions of their needs in the conditions of employment. Provisions are in-
cluded for activities that are considered potentially dangerous for the artist
and are commonly listed as "Extraordinary Risk." This might include, for
instance, as listed in Ballet Metropolitan's contract:
A. Suspension from a trapeze, wire or like contrivance
more than four (4) feet above the stage floor.
B. Performing on stilts or like devices which place the Art-
ist's feet more than four (4) feet above the stage floor.
C. Handling fire or performing near fire which has a flame
larger than that of a standard candle.
D. Directly operating explosive or pyrotechnic devices that
have not been deemed safe by a Fire Marshall or licensed
Pyro-technician. 5
Choreography may demand the use of props or real weapons which
require special handling. The San Francisco Ballet, for example, has spe-
cial regulations placed into contracts to protect its dancers. Here are a few
such safety provisions from the San Francisco Ballet's Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement: AGMA Regulations for Safety with Swords or Knives states
that:
During a performance on which a coordinated movement of
weapons occurs, there shall be a fight review of any such
scenes prior to the performance of said scenes during the
ballet. This fight review shall be scheduled and supervised
' See id. at 610.
5 See Basic Agreement between American Guild of Musical Artists and Ballet
Metropolitan, Inc.- July 1, 1999-June 30, 2002, para. 16(j), at 9.
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by the expert or his designee at fifteen (15) minutes to
curtain.6
Firearm Safety states that:
The EMPLOYER shall designate an Armorer who shall be
thoroughly familiar with the proper use and maintenance of
the firearms required in the production. The Armorer will
instruct all ARTISTS in the proper and safe use of the fire-
arms. This shall be a prerequisite prior to the issuance of
any firearm to any ARTIST for any rehearsal or perform-
ance. No one may overrule the Armorer's judgement in
this regard. 7
Fire Safety states that:
No ARTIST who feels unsafe carrying a live flame shall be
required to do so. This right shall not be invoked
unreasonably.8
The ground that a dancer dances upon is a source of great drama as
well. The floor can cause terrible injuries to joints and tendons if it does
not give when the dancer lands on it. Special clauses are added to insure
that dancers are not forced to dance on unhealthy floors. The San Francisco
Ballet Collective Bargaining Health Safety provision for example states
that:
No ARTIST shall be required to dance on a floor of con-
crete, marble or any similar material or on any surface laid
directly over such floor, which does not provide the appro-
priate airspace between such floor and the dance surfaces to
provide for adequate spring. Adequate spring shall be de-
fined as visible flex throughout the surface when pressure
from jumping is applied. 9
Similarly, San Francisco Ballet Health Safety A. General-13 states that:
6 See San Francisco Ballet Association- Final Draft Basic Agreement July 1999-
June 30, 2003: AGMA Regulations for Safety with Swords or Knives: See also
Exhibit 2(7), at 60.
7 See id. at Exhibit 3(1), at 61.
8 See id. at Ex. 4 (4), at 62
9 Basic Agreement on San Francisco Ballet Association, Final Draft, July 1999-
June 30, 2003, Ex. 5(A)(13), at 64.
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Pointe-work shall only be required on a non-slick, smooth
surface, which does not contain warps or bumps. Should
the floor contain any flaws deemed hazardous by AGMA,
the EMPLOYER shall designate maintenance work to be
done within one week of the report.' 0
Ballet Metropolitan's Collective Agreement section 24 paragraph (h) states
that:
The Artist shall not be penalized for refusal to rehearse and/
or perform on a concrete or carpeted floor even though it
may be covered with linoleum."
There is a special variation in this clause for required performances in Lec-
ture/Demonstration performances that often take place on the very hard
floors, which are prohibited, but due to audience convenience and tradition
are held on unsuitable floors. This is called a "hard floor variation" and
allows for modification of choreography to suit the needs and safety of the
artist's body:
Hard Floor Variation- Although the collective bargaining
agreement prohibits any ARTIST from rehearsing and/or
performing on a concrete or substandard floor, in the event
any ARTIST(s) is required to perform in a Lecture/Demon-
stration, Open Rehearsal or Performance on a substandard
floor as determined by a representative of the ARTISTS
and a member of the artistic staff, an alternative version of
the choreography will be performed to ensure the safety of
the ARTIST(s). Such alternative choreography will be less
physically demanding and will minimize all jumps and
modify pas de deux variations. The format will emphasize
character dances or adagio work from any pas de deux ex-
cluding jumps, variations and coda(s). 12
Clothing is also an important issue for dancers. There are rules for
artists such as when wearing a costume there is often a provision calling for
"No smoking, eating, drinking (other than water) or sitting in costume."'13
Or everyday work rules for dancers which designate what they can and
10 See id. at Ex. 5(A)(15), at 64.
1" See Basic Agreement between American Guild of Musical Artists and Ballet
Metropolitan, Inc., July 1, 1999-June 30, 2002 §24(h), at 17.
12 See id.
13 See supra note 11, Attach. A, § 11, at 41.
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cannot wear, like Ballet Metropolitan's rule 13 which enforces "only tight
fitting attire will be allowed during rehearsal periods. Baggy or loose cloth-
ing during rehearsal is prohibited, unless authorized by the artistic staff for
therapeutic reasons."' 4 This kind of rule seems to the outside-eye as quite
innocuous and as an obvious must for an artist whose body must be seen by
the rehearsal director in order to shape the dancer's movement choices prior
to show time. For the dancer, however, these kinds of rules restrict per-
sonal choices which often have more to do with personal safety then fash-
ion or the look of the choreography. Rehearsals for dancers are often a
grueling process of waiting for long periods of time to dance in a given
segment of choreography. During this time the body of a dancer can start to
get cold. The dancer must work very hard to maintain a warm body tem-
perature to keep ligaments and muscles ready to exert force and energy
while waiting for their cue to dance. Dance needs repetition to achieve a
level of understanding in the dancer. Each dancer must patiently wait while
other segments are repeated and this can take hours. During this time the
drop in body temperature can make the body vulnerable to injury.
Sweatpants and sweatshirts can help immensely in maintaining the body
heat of a dancer. These articles of clothing are often too baggy for rehearsal
directors and are requested to be removed even in cold weather rehearsals.
This is part of the discipline of being a dancer. For the art a dancer must
expose his or her body to the eyes and to the cold. Unfortunately, this
chilled unpleasantness can cause injuries to the most dedicated and selfless
dancer all in the name of aesthetic perfection.
As demonstrated by these provisions the dancer's employment con-
ditions are very detailed. AGMA did very well in establishing these condi-
tions for the dancer. The sensitivity and the energy the Union puts into
making sure the needs of the dancers are met is wonderful. Destructive
conditions which could end a dancer's career are effectively and aggres-
sively addressed. The objective conditions of dancing jobs are clearly de-
fined to maintain a healthy life of a dancer. The extraordinary measures the
Union takes increases the longevity of a dancer's career. Unfortunately, as
will be seen, the Union has not effectively protected the dancer from an
employer arbitrarily ending the dancer's career. Risks of injury are pro-
tected against in the work conditions, but the protection of dancers against
their employer leaves the collective bargaining agreement with a broken
ankle.
14 See id. §13, at 41.
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B. Atypical Clauses in the World of Collective Bargaining at Large.
1. Wages:
A centerpiece of a collective bargaining relationship is that the em-
ployees negotiate for wages collectively and the negotiated wages are appli-
cable to all individuals under the agreement, though wages may vary based
upon the position the person holds and the years of service. Failure to agree
on a rate of pay can result in lengthy strikes.
When one examines all the provisions of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act one of the mandatory subjects of bargaining is rate of pay. In the
National Labor Relations Act 8(d)"With respect to Wages, hours and other
conditions of employment" and 9(a) ". . .Rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment or other conditions of employment."' 15 In contrast, for the
dancer pay is determined individually, though under the NLRA it would be
an absolute violation for the employer to deal directly with individual em-
ployee to set wages different from those set out in the collective bargaining
agreement. 16 AGMA only negotiates a minimum wage but the actual wage
that an individual receives is individually negotiated between the employer
and the dancer. Not only does AGMA waive its right to negotiate individ-
ual wage rates but it mandates that each dancer sign an individual agree-
ment and negotiate with the employer as to the rate of pay that individual is
going to receive. The space on the Union's form for the individual agree-
ment for individual wage is left blank.' 7 Indeed, in order for the dancer to
come under the AGMA Collective Bargaining Contract, each dancer must
sign an individual artist contract with the employer.' 8 In other words, to
work for a particular company a dancer must sign an individual artist agree-
ment. Not surprisingly, this kind of pay structure is a divisive element in a
dance company.
2. Retention of employment.
Management's rights can seem at times unlimited to a dancer who
is simply thankful to have a dancing job. A good example of the sort of
power employer's exercise over dancers is articulated in the Pittsburgh Bal-
" See National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(d), 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), 159(a)
(1935).
16 "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer... (5) to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees." See id. §8(a)(5).
'7 See American Guild of Musical Artists, Standard Artist's Contract for Employ-
ment (Dancers) [hereinafter AGMA].
18 See id.
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let Theatre's Basic Agreement with AGMA-paragraph 63 Management's
Rights:
It is understood, however, that subject only to the express
provisions of this Agreement, the Employer retains the full
right to maintain, direct and control in its sole discretion
each and every aspect of operations of the Company in-
cluding, but not limited to, establishing reasonable rules to
govern the conduct of the Dancers. The Dancers shall be
informed of the rules as they are adopted. It is further rec-
ognized by AGMA that all artistic decisions remain exclu-
sively with the Employer and are not subject to the
grievance arbitration procedures established by this
Agreement. 19
Similarly, unlimited rights can be identified with respect to a
dancer's continuing employment with a company. The longest term of em-
ployment contemplated by the Individual Artist Agreement is for one year
(a contract for not less then 40 weeks). 20 After the first year, the employer
has sole discretion whether or not to re-engage the dancer for another year.
If the employer chooses not to retain the dancer this is referred to as "non-
reengagement." This can have devastating consequences for the dancer.
This is not just out of a job but potentially it can mean the end of a career
for a dancer. The reason is simple. A dancer's career life is a short one.
When a dancer gets a job in a company every day the dancer receives free
dance class as part of employment. These classes are part of the profes-
sional upkeep of technique and expressive articulation. Dance classes on
the street are expensive and a dancer needs to take class everyday to main-
tain their art and to be able to compete in auditions for a dance job.
Under the Standard Agreement the Artist comes under the provi-
sion "Pay or Play." This is a practice for dancers who are hired on a per-
formance basis, a weekly basis or an Engagement on Guaranteed Basis
(where the period covered, exclusive of options is one (1) year).21 "Pay or
Play" gives management the ability to not allow a dancer to dance though
they are still employees under their contract. It is rare to find a "just cause"
19 See Basic Agreement between Pittsburgh Ballet Theatre, Inc. and American
Guild of Musical Artists (AFL-CIO), Oct. 1, 1999-June 30, 2003, at 43.
20 See AGMA, supra note 17.
21 "Pay or Play: The employment of the DANCER hereinafter is non-cancelable,
and the compensation is "Pay or Play" both as to performances and rehearsals."
See id. §§l(b), 2(b), 3(b).
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clause in a dance company's contract.22 Even if the dance company does
have a "just cause" clause with "Pay or Play," management can effectively
remove an artist from rehearsals and performances simply by not using
them and paying them compensation for the rest of the contract period.
There is question as to whether the concept of "just cause" is alive in the
world of the performing arts. In The Round Dinner Playhouse the Arbitra-
tor addressed the "just cause" reality by taking "arbitral notice" that any
requirement of "just cause" for termination "is virtually unknown in the
theatrical world. '23 If an employer does indeed "discharge" an employee
and the employee believes it was not for "just cause" the contract has an
arbitration provision.24 "A significant percentage of cases that reach arbi-
tration involve discharge or disciplinary penalties assessed by manage-
ment. ' 25 Due to the short term of the contract itself and the back up of "pay
or play," it is rare that the employer is not able to wait out a contract which
is at most one year under the Engagement on Guaranteed Employment
Basis.26
The dancer has no opportunity to arbitrate wrongful discharge if it
is simply the end of the Contract term. This lack of a mechanism through
which the dancer may challenge his or her non-renewal renders all the other
provisions that provide protection to the dancer of limited effect and fails to
hold the management accountable for "arbitrary and capricious" actions.
By letting a contract run out, the employer avoids responsibility for firing
dancers when in fact these choices may be mere "whim or caprice. '27 This
freewheeling destructive spirit is why "most collective agreements do, in
fact, require "cause" or "just cause" for discharge or discipline. '28
The impact of the inclusion of a just cause discharge provision in
dance contracts is met by widely varying responses. Many a dancer and
most choreographers would view the approach of this clause with opposite
reactions, while, ironically, having identical visions of the impact of the
22 See, e.g., "Dismissal for Cause- EMPLOYER retains the right to dismiss the
ARTIST for cause," Pacific Northwest Ballet Association/American Guild of Mu-
sical Artists Master Agreement, July 1, 1999-June 30, 2002, § I, para. 19, at 10
[hereinafter PNWBA].
23 See In The Round Dinner Playhouse, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 118, 128 (1970)
(Kamin, Arb.).
24 See, e.g., PNWBA, supra note 22, § VIII, para. 53, at 46.
25 See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 610
(3d. ed. 1978).
26 See generally AGMA, supra note 17.
27 See Worthington Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1, 6-7 (1955).
28 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 25, at 612.
2001
114 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 7
clause. They both see the clause as a radical end to the world as it exists
today. These dancers would see the world transformed into a nirvana where
pure justice reigns and their employment would be protected from subjec-
tive termination by the choreographer. These choreographers would view
the world as coming to an end, with their artistic vision being held captive
to a contract clause that provides lifetime employment for all dancers. Both
these dancers and these choreographers would be wrong. The clause does
not do as much as they see it as doing. Dancers will be fired. The artistic
vision of the choreographer will be protected. All that the clause provides
the dancer is the opportunity to challenge the termination through the griev-
ance and arbitration process. All the clause requires of the employer is that
it be able to articulate the basis for the termination and that the discharge is
reasonably grounded. One such reasonable ground is artistic judgement,
and arbitrators will most certainly give great deference to this ground. The
world has changed, but not as radically as the dancer hoped or the choreog-
rapher feared.
Many a cynical labor lawyer will greet the proposal for the inclu-
sion of a just cause discharge provision with numb disdain. The assertion
will be made that, in the final analysis, the clause is meaningless because
the arbitrator will simply uphold any discharge of any dancer by any chore-
ographer, as long as, the magic words "artistic vision" are uttered by the
choreographer. These individuals are as wrong as those who see the clause
as earth shattering. Today, a dancer loses his or her job by simple inaction
by the choreographer. The choreographer simply decides not to "reengage"
the dancer. No new contract is signed. No explanation is required whatso-
ever. The choreographer has literally done nothing. The dancer is literally
unemployed. End of story. Under the clause, the dancer, once employed,
remains employed until one of two things happens, the dancer resigns, or
the dancer is discharged. If the dancer is discharged, the choreographer
must take the action of discharging the dancer, with full understanding that
they may need to explain the basis for this choice in a hearing before an
arbitrator. This is a weight. The basis needs to be carefully examined and
thought through. Already, the clause has changed the world, maybe not
radically, but significantly. The most extreme of the arbitrary and capri-
cious choices of a choreographer may be reigned in. Further, although arbi-
trators may be inclined to defer to "artistic vision," arbitrators are also able
to pierce through this veil and see that the discharge may, in fact, be based
upon other impermissible grounds, such as union activism, sexual orienta-
tion, race or ethnicity. Although there may be other statutory forums to
address such discrimination, none are as immediate or real as arbitration.
The clause provides real due process, and this due process can have real
significance in the dance world. A just cause discharge provision has the
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potential of moving the choreographers from the realm of the arbitrary into
the realm of considered actions that more closely resemble justice.
III. SIGNIFICANCE- ANALYSIS
A. "Just Cause" required with Due Process rights
The Termination of Employment Convention 158, 1982 was
adopted on June 22, 1982 when the International Labor Organization con-
vened in Geneva for its 68th session.29 Although not presently ratified by
the United States it is an internationally recognized Convention that gives
workers fundamental rights in regard to termination and continuation of
work whenever possible. It preserves the workers' humanity in an age
when the corporate machinery is accelerating at a dizzying pace. This Con-
vention will perhaps become one of the most central documents for
worker's rights as we face the new age of the World Trade Organization.
We are entering an exciting era for labor and the Termination of Employ-
ment Convention, 1982 will insure a new generation of dancers will have
shoes. It is clear that the Convention covers the kind of work that dancers
do and also it recognizes the faulty aspects that are present in their fragile
collective bargaining contracts. "Article 2: 1. This Convention applies to
all branches of economic activity and to all employed persons. '30 From
examining the Standard Artist's Contract for Employment for dancers and
numerous boilerplate provisions in the AGMA collective bargaining agree-
ments one can see that these contracts are not adequate under the Interna-
tional Labor Organization, Termination of Employment °Convention,
1982.31
Typically termed contracts set a term for a specific job of limited
time length. Article 2 section 3 of the Termination of Employment Con-
vention provides: "Adequate safeguards shall be provided against recourse
to contracts of employment for a specified period of time the aim of which
is to avoid the protection resulting from this Convention. '32 If a worker is
an architect, they can get a limited contract to create a house. Once the
house is built, the contract is complete and the architect has done his job. If
there is a Theater production that has a limited tour or a limited number of
shows then a limited time contract makes sense. When the specific number
29 Convention Conceming Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the
Employer, June 22, 1982 (visited Nov. 29, 2000) <http://ilolex.ilo.ch: 1567/scripts/
convde.p 1 ?query=c 158&queryO= 158&submit=Display>.
30 See id. at art. 2 §§ 1-3.
31 Id.
32 See id. at art. 2 § 3.
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of shows has been performed the job is finished and the job ceases to exist.
The limited time of the dancer's contract relates to nothing objective within
the dance company. It serves no purpose other than to provide the em-.
ployer with the opportunity to freely terminate anyone and everyone's em-
ployment once a year, every year.
Article 4 of the Termination of Employment Convention states:
"The employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid
reason for such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the
worker or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, estab-
lishment or service. '33 This requires that there shall be reason to discharge
an employee. This provision, in addition to the protection provided by Arti-
cle 2 section 3, gives dancers recognition of rights in the workplace when
the Contract seeks to give a sterility to discharge through the objective year
count down to the Employer's whim. 34 This Convention continues step by
step to help protect a worker at each dangerous challenge along the way.
Once a violation is asserted, through this internationally recognized conven-
tion, there must be mechanisms in place to create a stage on which the
involved parties can engage in dialogue regarding management termination
decisions. 35 Article 7 addresses the need for worker due process to chal-
lenge unjust termination. Article 7 states: "The employment of a worker
shall not be terminated for reasons related to the worker's conduct or per-
formance before he is provided an opportunity to defend himself against the
allegations made, unless the employer cannot reasonably be expected to
provide this opportunity." 36 This substantive right to "due process" is exer-
cised through the procedural right to challenge in the Convention Division
C. Procedure of Appeal Against Termination. Article 8(1) under Division
C. states: "1. A worker who considers that his employment has been unjus-
tifiably terminated shall be entitled to appeal against that termination to an
impartial body, such as a court, labour tribunal, arbitration committee or
arbitrator. ' 37 The power of this "impartial body" referred to in Article 8 is
articulated in Article 9(1). The role this "body" will undertake is to listen to
the employer's reasons for terminating an individual and determine whether
or not this was a justified action.38 In order to facilitate a hearing by an
"impartial body," Article 9(2) states options for how to prove wrongful ter-
mination. The burden of proving whether the termination was justified
33 See id. at art. 4.
34 See id. at art. 2 § 3.
35 See id. at art. 2 § 3
36 See id. at art. 7.
37 See id. at art. 8.
38 See id. at art. 9(1).
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does not rest on the worker's shoulders alone. There are two possibilities in
the Convention for shifting burdens. The first burden shifts entirely onto
the employer the obligation of proving that the termination was justified.
The other is a shared burden where both sides will tell an evidentiary story
before the eyes of the impartial body.3 9 Remedies for a worker when their
termination has been found unjustified are found in Article 10. Once it has
been determined that the termination was unjustified, this impartial body
will be able to order the employer pay compensation and other kinds of
reasonable relief to the individual who has suffered this injury. If it does
not conflict with the national laws and practice of the country to which the
employer belongs, the impartial body can also order reinstatement. 40
B. Without 'Just cause" all anti-discrimination guarantees become
meaningless.
International human rights are lost without the substantive right
against "un-just" termination and the procedural right to challenge the ter-
39 See id. at art. 9(2)(a), (b). 2. In order for the worker not to have to bear alone
the burden of proving that the termination was not justified, the methods of imple-
mentation referred to in Article 1 of this Convention shall provide for one or the
other or both of the following possibilities:
(a) the burden of proving the existence of a valid reason for the
termination as defined in Article 4 of this Convention shall rest
on the employer;
(b) the bodies referred to in Article 8 of this Convention shall be
empowered to reach a conclusion on the reason for the termina-
tion having regard to the evidence provided by the parties and
according to procedures provided for by national law and prac-
tice. See also art. 9(3). (In cases of termination stated to be for
reasons based on the operational requirements of the undertaking,
establishment or service, the bodies referred to in Article 8 of this
Convention shall be empowered to determine whether the termi-
nation was indeed for these reasons, but the extent to which they
shall also be empowered to decide whether these reasons are suf-
ficient to justify that termination shall be determined by the meth-
ods of implementation referred to in Article 1 of this
Convention.).
40 See id. at art. 10. If the bodies referred to in Article 8 of this Convention find
that termination is unjustified and if they are not empowered or do not find it prac-
ticable, in accordance with national law and practice, to declare the termination
invalid and/or order or propose reinstatement of the worker, they shall be empow-
ered to order payment of adequate compensation or such other relief as may be
deemed appropriate.
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mination through a grievance and arbitration process. Once you lose the
right to due process and the ability to challenge termination at work, you
lose all other human rights such as the right to unionize and the right not to
be discriminated against for race, creed, religion and sexual preference.
The United Nations, New York, 1978 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights grants these rights to every person in Article 2: "Everyone is entitled
to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinc-
tion of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."'4'
Once an employer can fire an employee for any reason, they can
discriminate against employees for reasons which are presently protected in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and these rights become unen-
forceable. Article 23 of this UN Declaration recognizes that labor itself is a
human right. Article 23(1) states: "Everyone has the right to work, to free
choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to
protection against unemployment. ' 42 If there is no mechanism to defend a
worker and challenge an employer, termination can occur because the em-
ployer does not agree with the worker's political beliefs or social activism.
This is in direct violation of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights which reads: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion
and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without inter-
ference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers. '43
There are no "just cause" nor "due process" protections in the
dance world. If you don't have a mechanism to challenge a decision, the
management has no need to listen because they are not held accountable for
their actions. Article 23(1) grants all people the right "to protection against
unemployment." 44 The labor practice in the dance world promotes unem-
ployment of dancers. The termed contracts have the effect of frustrating the
International Convention, Termination of Employment Convention, 1982.41
These worker artists have a fundamental human right to "due process."
41 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), at art. 2
(1948) (visited Nov. 29, 2000) <http://www.un.org/overview/rights.html>.
42 See id. at art. 23(1).
43 See id. at art. 19.
44 See id. at art. 23.
45 See International Labor Organization, Termination of Employment Convention,
1982 Convention 158 art. 2, §3 (1982). (Adequate safeguards shall be provided
against recourse to contracts of employment for a specified period of time the aim
of which is to avoid the protection resulting from this Convention).
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Not only is there a lack of internal mechanisms for dancers in the
realm of "just cause" accountability but there are rules about going to
outside sources for support or to voice to the public about mistreatment.
Dance companies often have a clause included in the Master Agreement
which curtails the freedom dancers have to go to the media about their job
concerns. The Publicity clause appears commonly as follows: "Publicity:
While ARTISTS are under contract all publicity is controlled by the EM-
PLOYER. ARTISTS shall cooperate by providing publicity information to
the EMPLOYER. ARTISTS shall not communicate with the media about
work related subject matter without coordinating with the EMPLOYER. 46
Whether this rule is in a collective bargaining agreement or not, the dancer
who goes outside their dance company to talk about the unjust treatment
and whimsical firing of dancers, will possibly ruin his or her chances of
getting hired in this small world of dance companies. The employer may be
diligently careful to hire "obedient" workers. Workers who won't betray
their boss, no matter how abusive the boss may be, are celebrated as the
stoic and sacrificing artist. The moments to dance in ones life have the
timing of mercury and the swiftness of an unexpected storm. Divining from
bones and muscles the meaning of gravity's flight, what more can a dancer
do to prove themselves worthy of a "just cause" termination. Dancers talk
in the dressing rooms, wondering aloud about how they treat dancers in
Europe. Most eyewitnesses return with news about how Europe loves the
dancer more than the United States does. "The United States stands alone
among the world's major industrialized nations in failing to protect employ-
ees from wrongful discharge through federal legislation. '47 Perhaps danc-
ers should not take this neglect so personally. It appears as if this approach
to labor as a disposable is prevalent not only in the dance studios but also
across the Nation. Watch the service employees dance from job to job and
you will see a choir rise in this physical story. These sounds will rise or fall
depending on how we choose to move through space. Perhaps, braver leaps
could be taken if we could establish "just cause" termination standards in
this country. Walking now, we approach a resolution to our disputes.
Walking an arbitral path, we will see what their rhythms have to say about
"unjust" discharge.
46 See e.g. Basic Agreement Between American Guild of Musical Artists and
Cunningham Dance Foundation, Inc. a/k/a Merce Cunningham Dance Company,
July 1, 1999-June 30, 2002, para. 40, at 30.
47 See Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the Model
Employment Termination Act, 43 AM.U.L.REv. 849, 890-91 (1994). See also Theo-
dore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward
Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 67 (1988).
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IV. THE TENDENCIES OF THE ARBITRATORS
The major form of dispute resolution in the work place is arbitra-
tion. "Arbitration has been the preferred method of resolving disputes
under collective bargaining agreements between unions and employers for
more than fifty years. '48 Through this private dispute resolution the em-
ployers can maintain the private ownership of their decisions and the em-
ployee can have an opportunity to stand before a third party to voice a
grievance. In the arbitration decisions one can sense the patterns that arbi-
trators fall into when it comes to arbitrating labor disputes in the subjective
realm of the performing arts. Deferring to employers' decisions is com-
monplace in discharge cases.
The tricks of termed contracts are well known in the world of per-
forming arts. On the television show "Hawaii Five-O" management used
termed contracts for the sound mixers and microphone boom operator. In
an arbitration involving employees who had been working on the television
show "Hawaii Five-O," it was an industry understanding amongst the em-
ployees that the job would last through the entire season. "Local 695 insists
that although the agreement does not expressly state sound technicians will
receive run-of-the-show commitments it nevertheless implicitly recognizes
that the tenure of an employee will last more than one week." 49 The em-
ployees were asked to make themselves available for the length of the sea-
son and move to an exotic location for filming. The contract they signed,
however, was only on a weekly basis. 50 When two employees were dis-
missed in the middle of the production season they demanded that their
"discharge" was not for "just cause" and in violation of that provision in the
contract. "The Company responds by asserting neither industry practice nor
the collective bargaining agreement guarantees run-of-the-season employ:
ment and the producer of 'Hawaii Five-O' was therefore free to terminate
the employment of the two grievants at any time following the completion
of one week of employment. ' 51 The arbitrator was unable to break from the
words on the page. The employees were not officially fired and therefore
48 See id. at 903.
49 See CBS Inc. v. International Sound Technicians Local 695, 81 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 361, 363 (1983) (Roberts, Arb.).
50 See id. at 361. The workers had the "contention that contract implicitly recog-
nizes that tenure of employees would last more than one-week period specified in
agreement and, pursuant to existing industry practice, they were entitled to "run-of-
the-show" employment. Grievants signed start slips that specifically defined their
employment as "week-to-week" and they reviewed with considerable care all other
entries in their start slips, including their weekly salary."
51 See id.
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did not come under the "just cause" provision. Similar to the termed con-
tracts for dancers, these television production employees were simply at the
end of their contract term and not given a new one. Without warning or
reason, they were not renewed for the week and would not be needed for
the rest of the production season. The Employer had no accountability for
discharging without "cause." 52 There was nothing more to be said because
the contract itself silenced the employees whom worked under its tight
scheme of unilateral management control. "It was therein held that a just
cause test was not applicable because the replacement of a craftsman during
a television series is not a discharge. '53 In the world of employment, con-
tracts can contain poison words that define the situation and label the par-
ticipants who consent to follow the definition. For artists, who lack
bargaining power to assert their rights, there are often clashes between the
reality and the words on the page.
Those who achieve high levels of technical skill and artistic mas-
tery of art can, with determination and skill, create and obtain work. Some
jobs are so successful that people are able to hold onto them for a number of
years. Still, in the most steady of employment there are still problems with
the tricky contract terms which get lost in time and painfully rediscovered
when at some future unknown date the "word" is used against the employee
seeking remedy for unjust discharge. In one particularly frustrating arbitra-
tion "[g]rievant had earned the first position on the Extras - Saxophone
ranking as the result of an audition, and had maintained such position for
nearly two years. 54 In this arbitration, the practice of the management to
name particular musicians, like the grievant, "Extras" in their contract de-
spite their stabile presence in the orchestra, was an industry standard.
Though the saxophonist was fired without cause, the union had failed to
change this practice through its contract negotiations. He had been there for
two years and achieved the prestigious position of first seat saxophone. Be-
cause the contract used the word "Extra" to describe his position, there was
no "just cause" protection for dismissal. His presence and achievement
52 See id.
53 See id. at 364. The experience of the two grievants was common to the practice
in this industry. They were asked if they could make themselves available for the
full production season and both men responded in the affirmative. The inquiry put
to them was not, however, a guarantee of employment for the entire season. The
producer had to be assured of their ability to serve but an inquiry regarding poten-
tial availability does not constitute a guarantee of employment for a term greater
than that provided by the collective bargaining agreement
54 See Columbus Symphony Orchestra v. Musicians Local 103, 92 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 1203, 1206 (1989) (Fullmer, Arb.).
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within the Symphony were easily disregarded by management when they
chose to fire him "arbitrarily."
When a union fails to secure a "just cause" provision through col-
lective bargaining, they have essentially hobbled their members, as well as,
any third party arbitrator, from being able to effectively combat unjustified
terminations. In an arbitration involving the American Federation of Televi-
sion and Radio Artists, the arbitrator was looking around desperately for
someone to help. "Since the AFTRA Agreement contains no just cause
provision, there are no identifiable individuals to whom backpay can be
awarded for Golden West's contract violations. 5 5 These situations are un-
fortunate when the union itself is unable to negotiate a contract containing a
"just cause" provision. These situations would be remedied if our country
accepted the International Labor Organization's standard of a broad all en-
compassing labor standard of "just cause" for termination.
There are those who argue that the performing arts are of a subjec-
tive nature and therefore cannot be touched by legal regulation. Law deals
with many subjective aspects of life. No one would stipulate that marriage
is an objective union. We have laws which secure the benefactors to its
stability and honor. When and if there is a break in this union, the law
addresses the issues and weighs the equity stemming from the redrafting of
this human contract. Every kind of work invites the intimacy of human
interpretation. We all have likes, dislikes and reasons for being where we
are at particular moments in the day. Work is a reason for being some-
where, but it is not an end in and of itself. Human beings make choices
within mechanisms of production. "The evaluation of talent in the perform-
ing arts is highly subjective in any event; better it be done by those who are
intimately involved in the process themselves, the common acceptance has
it, so long as good faith is the prism for the evaluation. '5 6 Good faith is the
standard of decency that is missing when unreasonable terminations are
made on a whim. Being fired is a risk for all workers, whether they dance
or not. If the employer chooses to fire a person at least let that occupational
"death" be for good reason.5 7 If an employee is fired let there be a reason
articulated by the employer for it.
A Dallas news anchorwoman was fired without warning due to
something management referred to as "unsuitability." Though, according to
55 See Golden West Broadcasters v. American Federation of Television & Radio
Artists, 93 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 691, 698 (1989) (Jones, Arb.).
56 See id.
57 See Universal Frozen Foods v. Teamsters, Local 839, 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 24,
26 (1992) (Lacy, Arb.); University of Pennsylvania v. International Union of Oper-
ating Engineers, Local 835, 99 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 353, 360 (1992) (DiLauro, Arb.).
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the union grievance the News Director violated the "just cause discharge"
provision in the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator found that
he could defer to the judgement of management. 58 The arbitrator was given
plenty of evidence that the news anchorwoman was "competent" and had
not been a bad employee. Yet the arbitrator stated:
Nothing prevents the Company from striving for excel-
lence; all business and competitive considerations support
that objective. Seeking and achieving that objective of ex-
cellence rests upon the News Director's best judgment as to
employees' abilities; the Collective Bargaining Agreement
reserves that judgment exclusively to the management of
the station.59
When one enters the world of performance one steps into a magic
world where the fickle ways of "artistic vision" are used to excuse the
topsy-turvy decisions of management. "The success or failure of television
news depends not only on the objective measures of a reporter's skills, but
also on that indefinable extra dimension that all witnesses agreed was a
judgment call."'60 This "indefinable extra dimension" is the pro-manage-
ment twilight zone which arbitrators believe in when it comes to the per-
forming arts. This anchorwoman was an award-winning journalist and was
well respected in the field. This kind of firing has a way of shaking the
entire work staff, which might be part of management's tactic in doing such
an arbitrary firing. The company photographer who worked closely with
the news team, which this woman was a part of, said that when this reporter
was fired "I was surprised. Everyone was surprised. I mean, I just was sur-
prised because it was like a bolt out of the blue. I didn't-I didn't think she
had done anything wrong."'6 1 In another broadcasting case where the arbi-
trator upheld the discharge of a reporter for "unsuitability," the station man-
agement was unhappy with the broadcaster because the grievant's voice
was too "mild and mellow" and the management want a "brisk-type" of
delivery. 62 The arbitrator believed he should not "substitute his judgment
for that of management," and felt this was especially needed due to the
''special nature of the broadcasting industry and the subjective evaluations
58 See KDFW-TV v. American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, 94
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 806 (1990) (Allen, Arb.).
19 See id. at 811.
60 See id.
61 See id. at 813
62 See Taft Broadcasting Company v. American Federation of Television and Ra-
dio Artists, 64 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 211, 216 (1974) (Goetz, Arb.).
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of listener taste involved in such a determination." If the audience does not
see you on the television or the stage, how are they supposed to evaluate if
they like you or not? In the Dallas case the arbitrator states that "entertain-
ers only survive if they can attract audiences. '63 Of course how can an
entertainer attract audiences if they are fired even when they are getting
good ratings for the television show or are part of a show that is selling
tickets. If an artist is taken away from the audience's eyes, and the em-
ployee is not a well-known star, the audience may not know what they are
missing. The audience does not know what is going on backstage, they
come to be entertained and inspired.
Another example of an "unsuitability" discharge is an arbitration
concerning Storer Broadcasting Company. 64 A news anchorman was dis-
charged because of age and claims from the management that ratings were
suffering. The AFTRA union tried to help the news anchorman retain his
job in some other capacity. The employer was not willing to find another
job for this employee. The news director simply maintained that the news
anchor was "unsuitable" for his job. The arbitrator found this subjective
standard part of a business decision involving ratings and consulting reports
and, just like in the Dallas case, did not want to get involved in the subjec-
tive judgements of a news director. The news director wanted to attract
advertisers with a new "young" look. This employee did not fit that new
business image and was fired. Though it was not "just cause" the arbitrator
said that the contract included firing for other reasons. It was determined
that the decision was at least based on a reasonable business decision and
made in good faith seeking profit for the station.
The management treats artists as replaceable. Each artist is a
unique expression of humanity. Every person is irreplaceable and should
be given the decency of, at least, "just cause" when they are fired. The
arbitrator states in the Dallas case that the selection process was even
known to the reporter who was discharged as being "a host of nonquantifi-
able intangibles. '65 This seems to serve management's power to fire.
When the selection process has no justice, then you are in a state of constant
auditioning. In an arbitration of the WFMJ Broadcasting Company, the ar-
bitrator based his decision to defer to management decisions on the subjec-
tive nature of broadcasting choices and how "its employees differ from
those in a mass production industry where performance may be evaluated in
such terms as the number of pieces produced per hour and the quantity of
63 See KDFW-TV, supra note 58, at 815.
64 See Storer Broadcasting Company (78-2 ARB 8303).
65 See KDFW-TV, supra note 58, at 815.
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material used or wasted in achieving such production. ' 66 Everyday, the
management has the opportunity to become "inspired" by something new.
Something other than what you can provide... no matter how excellent you
are in your profession.
In Cosmos Broadcasting of Louisiana, Inc., the arbitrator again de-
ferred to the choices of the employer who had fired the newscaster claiming
the need to bring in advertisers. The arbitrator justified his decision by
calling advertising the "lifeblood" of a television station. Also, backing
away from the personal responsibility of the employer for making this
choice to fire this individual, the arbitrator stated that the "nature" of the
entire broadcasting industry had "peculiar problems" and that on-air televi-
sion performers have "no such objective standards" by which they can be
judged.67 It is true that the world of performing arts is subjective. The
conclusion that there can be no justice in this world, however, is wrong.
The employees lost in these arbitrations due to the assertion of subjective
standards that the arbitrator preferred to leave untouched. It was, none the
less, an important opportunity for these employees to be heard by a third
party arbitrator and for the employees to hear their employer's reasons for
firing them. Through exploring these arbitration decisions involving unjust
dismissal, under a perceived "just cause" provision agreement, we can see a
pattern of choices being made by arbitrators in subjective scenarios. It is
tragic to think of all of the stories of suffering at the hands of an arbitrary
employer that go unwitnessed when there is no "just cause" provision in the
collective bargaining agreement.
In this situation, weak is strong. It is a small process that can
change the world. The addition of just cause discharge provisions seeks to
provide a bit of space and time for employers to think before moving death
upon a dancer. This will stop the tyrannical employer from taking arbitrary
and capricious actions. An employer should not be able to destroy people
by firing them, on account of being in a bad mood one day. If a dancer
refuses an employer's sexual advances without a just cause provision, for
instance, this dancer with an absolutely shining path in his or her art can be
fired at will. No accountability breeds cruel territorial violation in its
silence.
66 See WFMJ Broadcasting Company v. National Association of Broadcast Em-
ployees and Technicians, 52 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 995, 996 (1969) (Hertz, Arb.).
67 See Cosmos Broadcasting of Louisiana v. American Federation of Television
and Radio Artists, 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1332, 1339 (1977) (Taylor, Arb.).
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V. THE EUROPEAN VALIDATION OF JUST CAUSE
In the United States we have no comprehensive regime for "just
cause" termination. This is very unusual in the world of labor. Across
Europe there is a strong appreciation for the need to have this kind of pro-
tection in the workplace and their labor laws recognize this fundamental
importance. Not only have all of the nations in the European Union signed
the International Labor Organization Convention, but also new sections
dealing specifically with "just cause" termination have been signed. Europe
clearly validates the need for acceptance of a standard of "just cause" termi-
nation in employment. It should be noted that all of these statutes have no
exclusion of dancers or performing artists from their coverage. The United
States has recognized the devastating effect that being fired has on its citi-
zens, but has failed to provide any protection when the employer's reasons
for the dismissal are "arbitrary and capricious." If "[d]ischarge is viewed as
the 'capital punishment' of the shop," there should be statutory recognition
of the need for employee due process when such drastic actions are exe-
cuted by employers.68 Through describing various European statutes, it will
become clearer that the United States is falling behind in its labor standards.
.uring this time of globalization of labor and international trade it is essen-
tial that the United States recognize the importance of "just cause" termina-
tion and step up to join all other industrialized nations in establishing
accountability for employer's actions. This will help insure a more stabile
and productive workforce and help the United States maintain a strong
economy that expresses the strength of all its citizens who participate in
harvesting the wealth it helps to produce.
In 1938 Sweden took its first major step to establish job security in
the Basic Agreement between the SAF (Swedish Employers Confederation)
and LO (Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions) of 1938. The Basic
Agreement was amended in 1964 to require just cause for dismissal. A new
dispute resolution section for arbitration was added to the 1964
amendment. 69
In Germany, there is a system in which the employer must report
the dismissal prior to its execution. The German "model of workers' partic-
ipation is the German works council which must be consulted by the em-
ployer before every dismissal. Failure to do so results in the dismissal
68 See Universal Frozen Foods v. Teamsters Local 839, 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 24,
26 (1992) (Lacy, Arb.); University of Pennsylvania v. Intemational Union of Oper-
ating Engineers Local 835, 99 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 353, 358 (1992) (DiLauro, Arb.).
69 See Bob Hepple, European Rules on Dismissal Law, 18 COMP. LAB. L. 204,
210-11 (1997).
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being null and void. '70 This is the main control mechanism used to protect
employees in Germany. This requirement of 102(1) of the Work Constitu-
tion Act requires that the employer must consult before "every dismissal, be
it an ordinary or extraordinary dismissal, with the sanction that a breach of
this duty renders the dismissal null and void. '71 The strength added through
sanction, gives teeth to this already strong legislation requiring employers
stand witness to their own acts.
France is a good example of a European country that supports its
employees through statutory development in the area of termination. "In
France licenciement pour motif economique has been subject to a special
regulatory regime dating back to 1975 and is defined according to two es-
sential criteria: the reason for dismissal must not relate to the individual
concerned (licenciement pour motif individuel) and the termination must
derive from the abolition or alteration of the job or from a refusal to accept
a substantive change to the contract of employment. '72 Some individuals
might ask why the French labor tradition is relevant to the United States.
Using the booming economy as a reason to take a hands off approach when
it comes to such a "bull market." The poetry of the strikes in France may
ring a nostalgic bell to some Americans, but perhaps the United States has
not yet reached the level of the French revolutionary labor spirit. One thing
remains true, despite our differing histories, the soil of both countries
breeds poets and there are new developments in labor to sing songs about.
Some think our songs in America are a little melancholy right now, and
these people may be right. But to this I say, no fear for the future that
hasn't happened. As the folks in New Orleans demonstrate, we can dance
away from any funeral, except our own. Labor dances on.
France had an early start in addressing abusive firings. "This prin-
ciple of abus de droit or the employer's abuse of its right to discharge was
finally adopted by statute in 1928." 73 Not only did they have an early start,
but also they have run the marathon with strength. The distance they cover
involves a court which shows a willingness to bow to labor. This degree of
respect from the courts is not known to labor in the United States. "The
French courts appear more willing than American courts to find that a dis-
missal was arbitrary or capricious. . . employers are required to give the
70 Id. at 211. See also Works Const. Act of 1972, 102(1) BetrVG.
I1 d. at 224. See also Works Const. Act of 1972, 102(1) BetrVG.
72 Antoine Lyon-Caen, European Employment and Industrial Relations Glossary:
France 478 (1993).
73 Madeleine M. Plasencia, Employment-at-Will: The French Experience as a Ba-
sis for Reform, 9 COMP. LAB. L. 294, 299 (1988). See also 1 RECEUIL DALLOZ
94 (1920).
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French court a reason for the dismissal; courts have often found the em-
ployer's reason to be mere pretext for unfair dismissal... the French courts
have extended the doctrine of abuse of right to situations in which the em-
ployer failed to follow customary or collectively bargained procedures and
rules. '74 The French may have full disclosure and accountability principles
which cover the hearing of grievances, but even they have much work to
do. For example, interestingly, the only remedy for an abusive discharge in
France is damages, never reinstatement.
Though France has strong legal mechanisms for labor, this has not
been won without a fight. "Pressure from the unions, an increase in sensi-
tivity to the persisting problems of job security and official impetus from
the adoption of ILO Recommendation No. 119 led the French government
to amend its dismissal statute for the first time. Codified as Title II of the
Labor Code, the Law of 1973 requires the utilization of procedural safe-
guards and provides for judicial review of the employer's decision to termi-
nate an employee. '75 The problem with the Law of 1973, only addressing
indefinite termed contracts, was changed in the Act of 1979 "which regu-
lates contracts of employment of definite duration. '76 Out of the process of
effort that the French workers have exerted through asserting their desire
for change, they have created a legal environment which addresses difficult
problems with sensitive answers. "The right to work in France is the in-
creasing accumulation of legalities and rules ever more precise, complex
and detailed. These legalities embody the positive rights of workers. '77
Actions which seek to address the workplace may not be able to create a
simple world of rules, but at least the standards give working people and
their employers a sense of what their responsibilities are to each other.
VI. EUROPEAN "JUST CAUSE" STANDARDS DANCE ON THE GROUND OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION CONVENTION.
The International Labor Organization Convention contains an ex-
pansive and inclusive recommendation on the Termination of Employment
that indicates that the International Community has in fact addressed this
matter. "The member states of the International Labor Organization (ILO)
adopted Recommendation No. 119 on the Termination of Employment at
74 Id. at 300.
75 Id. at 302. See also C. Civ. art. 73-680 (amending the Labor Code in regard to
termination of an indefinite employment contract).
76 Id. at 303.
77 See id. at 307.
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the 1963 International Labor Conference. '7 8 The member states choose to
become signatories to a specific Convention voluntarily. Once ratified the
member state accepts the obligation to implement the convention in their
state. The employees, within the countries that have signed onto these
rights, are protected by an International Standard that covers them without
the need for collective bargaining. These standards are established as a
right through the convention. Though the workers may still need to express
themselves through a strike, even with the Convention, there is at least a
stronger national acceptance to the minimum standard.
One can see the principles of the ILO echoed in the European statu-
tory mechanisms we have previously explored. "The Recommendation set
forth guidelines requiring that employers advance a valid reason for termi-
nation. Under these guidelines, the employer may not base a dismissal on
an employee's union membership or representation on race, color, sex, mar-
ital status, religion, political opinion, national or social origin. ' 79 The Rec-
ommendation requires the employer to give the employee notice, as well as
time off from work during this notice period to seek other employment. If
the employer provides the employee with no notice, compensation for this
failure must be provided to the employee.80 The employer must also pro-
vide the employee with "severance pay and a certificate of dismissal."' l
The European Community has rules that are as follows: "[T]he su-
pervisory machinery of the ILO and of the Council of Europe reviews na-
tional laws and practices in the light of the standards set in the instruments,
EC directives impose obligations on Member States to implement them by
laws, administrative practice or collective agreement. '8 2 Though there still
is much work to be done in Europe to create a standard among the member
states which will create a smoother flow of labor understanding within the
European Community, there is already a much stronger consciousness to-
ward "just cause dismissal" in Europe.8 3 Europe is so advanced in each
78 See id. at 300. See also 1982 ILO Conference, ILO Convention No. 158
(ratified).
79 See Recommendation No. 119, Part IV at 18. International Labor Conference,
Record of 67' Session, 1982: Report VIII(l) - Termination of Employment at
the Initiative of the Employer [Eighth Item on the Agenda] 102-05 (1980) (reprint
of the text of the 1963 Recommendation).
80 See id. at pt. II at 3(d).
81 See id. at pt. II at 8(1). See also Plasencia, supra note 76, at 301. See also
International Labor Conf. Recommendation No. 119, Part IV at 18, pt. II at 3(d), pt.
II at 8(1).
82 See Hepple, supra note 69, at 219-220.
83 See id. at 220.
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country's recognition of "just cause" discharge, that they can work together
to find a common standard for the European Community. Not unlike musi-
cians coming together to jam, the European Community is fluent in this
labor language and now seeks to create harmony.84
84 See Jack Stieber, Protection Against Unfair Dismissal: A Comparative View, 3
CoMP. LAB. L. 229, 230-31 (1980). "A 1976 Report of the European Commission
drew attention to the variation in conditions, procedures and legal consequences of
dismissal provisions in member states, and put forward proposals to serve as a basis
for an EC directive on individual dismissals. The EC Commission Report states
that member state laws and standards should be harmonized along the following
lines:
1. Dismissal is justified only when "serious grounds" exist.
"Serious grounds" is defined in terms of "urgent require-
ments of the firm," i.e., "when it is impossible or unreasona-
ble, for economic or technical reasons or for reasons
connected with the person or behavior of the worker, for the
employer to continue the employment relationship."
a) Personal grounds shall be deemed to exist only when a
worker has, over a long period of time, shown himself to
be incapable of carrying out his duties.
b) Behavioral grounds for dismissal presuppose a serious
breach of a worker's obligations under the individual con-
tract of employment.
c) Even when grounds exist, dismissal should be a last re-
sort. When dismissal is unavoidable, employers should
take account of a worker's age, length of service, future
job prospects and family circumstances.
2. A worker is entitled to written notice and, on request, a writ-
ten statement of the grounds for dismissal. He should also be
advised of his legal remedies.
3. Consultation with worker representatives should precede
dismissal.
4. Except in cases of "summary dismissal," minimum notice of
thirty days should be given.
5. Summary dismissal should be resorted to only if the worker
is guilty of such a severe breach of his obligations under the
contract of employment that the employer cannot reasonably
be expected to observe a notice period.
6. The legality of every dismissal must, at request of the
worker, be examined by an independent body.
7. Protection against dismissal should be provided only to em-
ployees with at least six months service in the undertaking."
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Implementation of the ILO has inspired legal systems within the
member states to expand their recognition of these labor issues. For exam-
ple, "the French, as signatory to ILO Recommendation No. 119, adopted
the ILO standards relating to unjust cause. Since the implementation of the
ILO Recommendation in France, the highest court of France, the Cour de
Cassation, has undertaken the task of shaping the contours of what is meant
by "genuine and serious cause. '85 When the rules are changed to promote a
more equitable playing field, perceptions of the entire game are changed in
the mind of the judicial system and society. This perception reaches be-
yond the concept of unionization, into the realm of pure humanity. There
needs to be respect through employer accountability to the treatment of the
employee and the investment of time and energy every worker puts into his
or her labor. There is no exclusion of performing artists in the ILO. Even
in the subjective world of artistic labor, these standards stand strong. Art
may allow human beings to transcend the mind's world, but after the cur-
tain falls we all must turn on the lights and live in the workplace. The
question is, will this workplace reflect our fundamental rights as human
beings, or will it transform the beauty of human life into simply a tool to be
used up and thrown away. It is our choice as human beings to seize our
time and consider the possibilities in such questions.
VII. EXPANSION OF "JUST CAUSE" PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES:
SHALL WE DANCE?
Expansion of this recognition of termination for "just cause" pro-
tection in the United States is necessary to create a strong and secure labor
force that best expresses the democratic values of due process and self-
determination. These values, that this country is proud to celebrate and
espouse in its spoken ideals, should be carried out in its actions in the waltz
of the everyday. "The United States is the only industrialized nation in the
world that does not have national legislation protecting employees from
wrongful discharge. ' 86 Now the action must follow the words, to demon-
strate to the world that we support our workers and seek fundamental jus-
tice in the workplace. We need to show that we will support labor justice
for each individual, and will help them when the employer has shut the
individual out of their livelihood for frivolous reasons. At this stage in our
country's development in labor, the courts feel uneasy about addressing
85 Plasencia, supra note 73, at 315.
86 See Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the Model
Employment Termination Act, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 849, 923 (1994). See also Theo-
dore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward
Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56 (1988).
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even public policy in the work place for blatant violations. "Even if there
appears to be some basis for a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy, there is no guarantee that the court will recognize the public
policy at issue. 87
We have seen how the collective bargaining agreements of dancers,
musicians and other performing artists magically transform into employ-
ment-at-will contracts with the flick of the employer's wand of strange dis-
satisfaction. The worker is not at home in the fragile world of employment-
at-will. There is no safety for them, no matter how dedicated they are. The
rules are imposed unilaterally and the employees acquiesce to their daily
strain. 88
There are those who declare that because the economy is booming,
the worker has no business disrupting the flow of capital. This vision of
humanity lives in the safety of abstraction. It separates the numbers from
their source and the conditions under which that source of capital is living.
"Extending a minimum amount of protection against arbitrary and capri-
cious discharge to the vast majority of U.S. workers will not disadvantage
U.S. employers in the international market because the United States would
be joining the vast majority of industrialized nations that already have in-
corporated ILO unjust dismissal standards into their national legislation." 89
This world is a productive and creative one. The market is full of individu-
als. These individuals will shape the market's identity through the actions
they take through time and space.
One might ask, if there is presently so little success in the world of
arbitration for performing art employees who have "just discharge" provi-
sions and still are discharged without cause, what difference would it make
to have "just cause" provisions in the work contracts for dancers. It is true
that these employees are "losing" arbitrations, even with the "just cause"
provisions, but the fight to get "just cause" provisions in dance contracts
transcends winning or losing. It is a small win of words whose very pres-
ence in a contract will deter some of the most heinous and destructive be-
havior of employers who exercise tyrannical cruelty upon their employees
87 See Sprang, supra note 86, at 887.
88 See James Atleson, Confronting Judicial Values: Rewriting the Law of Work in
a Common Law System, 45 BuFF. L. REv. 435, 443 (1997). "Thus, employment at
will, as many have noted, assumes, without an inquiry into the parties' intentions,
the employer's power to make rules, interpret them unilaterally, and, most criti-
cally, discipline and discharge arbitrarily. Moreover, the modem easing of doc-
trines of consideration and mutuality did not necessarily apply to the employment
relation."
89 See Plasencia, supra note 73, at 318 (footnote omitted).
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in the name of "artistic vision." The point is that in this dance world of
desolation without "just cause" for termination, the ability to assert due pro-
cess rights and demand accountability from the employer in the contracts
for dancers is a fundamental part of existence in a true labor world. "Just
cause" is as fundamental to a labor contract, as air is to breathe. The cynic
may say that this is not worth fighting for because the dancer will still lose.
But would that all life comes to death, stop us from dreaming? The struggle
for a just workplace in dance is a difficult one. In this world, where dance
workers find no protection for their investment of time through their labor,
to achieve a "just cause" termination provision would make all the differ-
ence in the world. The key is to open up the doors of the workplace and let
light shine upon the employer's dark decisions that befall the dancer.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Although, many of these problems have been taken care of in Eu-
rope through statutes, in the United States we have not chosen to take such
legislative steps. It does not appear likely that such legislation will be
adopted in the near future. In the United States issues relating to the protec-
tion of just discharge are dealt with in collective bargaining agreements
negotiated between employers and employees. In examining the current
collective bargaining agreements negotiated on behalf of dancers by
AGMA, there are various modifications that arguably could provide "just
cause" discharge protection for dancers. In the following, one direction will
be set forth that such contract modifications could take.
As discussed above, under the collectively negotiated master agree-
ment, each individual dancer must as a condition of employment enter into
an individual agreement with the employer. If the employer chooses not to
execute this individual agreement, this dancer's employment is terminated.
There are two aspects of the individual agreement: (1.) Rate of pay (2.)
After the first year you are not an employee unless the employer signs an
individual employment agreement. Instead of saying the decision of the
employer to not re-engage must be for "just cause" and subject to the griev-
ance and arbitration process, it makes more sense to sever any linkage be-
tween the individual agreement and continued employment. The individual
agreement should have nothing to do with continued employment, only the
individual wages to be negotiated above the minimum established in the
Master Agreement. In the event that the individual artist and employer are
unable to reach agreement on the individual's wage, then a mechanism for
the resolution of the dispute can be established, such as a set percent in-
crease over the preceding year or arbitration of wages, such as is done in
some professional sports. Having removed any issue relating to re-engage-
ment from the individual artist agreement the dancer is then provided in the
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master agreement a real traditional "just cause" discharge provision. If an
employer wishes to terminate a dancer's employment, the dancer has the
right to grieve such termination, and if necessary, go to arbitration regard-
ing such termination. The employer will have to justify to the arbitrator
that such termination was for "just cause." If the employer fails in his bur-
den to establish that the termination was for "just cause," the dancer will be
reinstated with back pay. This provides the dancer with the substantive
right that any discharge be for "just cause," and the procedural right to
challenge any discharge through the grievance and arbitration process.
Right now, all the employer has to do is simply not sign the indi-
vidual agreement and you are fired. They call it non-reengagement. Before
they refused to sign it, you had a job. After they refused to sign it, you do
not have a job. One of the more friendly contracts comes out of the Pacific
Northwest Ballet.90 Management gives an evaluation of each dancer four
weeks before the contract expires and management is supposed to notify the
dancer whether or not they will be re-engaged. If management intends to
end the employment relationship, the dancer may write a letter to the man-
agement telling them why they think they should not be let go. The dancer
truly does not have any say about the continuation of their employment
because there is no mechanism in place to hold the employer accountable
for discharging without "just cause." The contract term will end and the
employer will not sign the individual employment agreement. At evalua-
tion time the dancer is notified that they have four weeks to be a dancer
with the company, without any mechanism to challenge the decision. The
Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 asserts that the employer
must have "just cause" in order to "discharge an employee. The employ-
ment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for
such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or
based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or
service."91
This struggle is for accountability. Employers must be held ac-
countable for their actions. No more private suffering for the employee
who has been discharged. If someone is going to be fired, at least make the
employer stand witness and explain their actions in a dispute resolution
forum. This is also a great opportunity, for the employer to be as large as
their actions and to seize responsibility for their own lives and their own
effect upon the world. There will still be cruel humans. But much cruelty
takes place by virtue that outside forces can be blamed and the individual
90 See PNWBA, supra note 22, at §1(5)(f).
91 See Convention Concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the
Employer, supra note 29, at art. 4.
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who took such action simply places responsibility in something outside
themselves. The choreographer may use "artistic inspiration" as their ex-
cuse to destroy another person's life. The arbitrator may defer to such an
unknowable mystery as "inspiration." Or perhaps, it is simply finding
someone "unsuitable" which tells the arbitrator to turn the other way. Re-
gardless of these losses, without the presence of the provision, the story
never gets to be witnessed by the arbitrator. The story is simply over and
the dancer is left hanging without a reason for their end. The lack of clo-
sure to such an important occupational and life change is probably the
wound that never heals. The question is left and there is no opportunity to
address the problem. With a "just cause" provision there is one last dance,
at least. One final encore before the curtain closes, and with this, the dance
can become most meaningful. Every player will choose the role they wish
to play, and all of their actions have built that character. It may seem like
this last dance is a weak one. So often the dancer will fall in the end. But
there is hope that, at times, the arbitrator will be able to pierce the artistic
veil to find that the true motivation is not to serve an artistic vision but to
serve illegitimate ends. Removal of the union activist or the person with
the offending sexual orientation serves no artistic vision. In the performing
arts we know that there are no small parts only small actors. So we give the
employer an effective speaking role in this drama of life changing choices.
In the dancer's collective bargaining agreement the termination
mechanism should be removed from the Individual Artist Agreement. Ter-
mination should be handled under a regular collective bargaining agreement
"just cause" provision. The only thing that should be determined by the
individual agreement is wages. The job continues and if a person is doing
their job well they have a right to that job. If the employer wants to dis-
charge an employee they should have "cause" and stand before a third party
arbitrator to justify their reasons for discharging an employee. This is a job
like any other job. The key is to protect the dancer, just like every worker
has a right to be protected, by giving them a voice to be witnessed by the
world and not be exploited for their labor in silence.
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